PER CURIAM.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan certified the following question to this Court pursuant to MCL 7.305(B):

We granted the request to answer the question.2 Having heard the parties' oral arguments, and having reviewed the briefs filed by the parties and other interested amici curiae, we answer under the law applicable to this case and the facts as presented: No, assuming that a decedent's brain was removed by a medical examiner to conduct a lawful investigation into the decedent's cause of death, the decedent's next of kin does not have a right under Michigan law to possess the brain in order to properly bury or cremate the same after the brain is no longer needed for forensic examination.

At all times relevant to the underlying federal district court case, this issue was governed by MCL 52.205(5).3 This statute provided:

Because the statute required only prompt return of "the body"—and because it permitted the medical examiner to retain portions of the body in order to detect crime—this law provided next of kin no clear right to the return4 of a brain lawfully removed and retained for forensic examination after the body was returned to the decedent's family for burial or cremation. Further, plaintiff has not disputed defendants' assertions that there was an historical practice of retaining, examining, and later disposing of an examined brain when MCL 52.205 was enacted in 1953 and that medical examiners promulgated rules to permit this practice under MCL 52.201c.5 Finally, no Michigan caselaw gives next of kin a possessory right to a decedent's brain following a lawful forensic examination.

YOUNG, J. (dissenting).

I continue to adhere to my stated position in In re Certified Question (Wayne Co. v. Philip Morris Inc.), ___ Mich. ___, 622 N.W.2d 518 (2001), that this Court lacks the authority under state law to answer certified questions. However, my position has failed to carry the day. See Proposed Amendment of MCR 7.305, 462 Mich. 1208 (2000). While this Court has chosen to assert the right to exercise that authority, I will exercise careful discretion before answering any certified question.

In light of the recent amendment of the relevant statute by 2010 PA 108, this case now only concerns a putative class of persons whose arguable claims arose before the effective date of the amendment. Accordingly, the legal significance of the question certified by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan is considerably diminished. I would decline to answer the question in this instance.

DAVIS, J. (dissenting).

I would decline to answer the certified question because I am not persuaded that the Court should answer this certified question.